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final takeover attempt. It provides an opportunity to co-operate with the target and its 
management to better evaluate the synergies before the possible acquisition. The 
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1. Introduction 
 
We live in a time of the rapid global bull market, overvaluation and uncertainty. The 
S&P500 reached the new milestone in the spring of 2014, when the threshold of 2000 
index points was achieved. After the global financial crisis in 2008, the global market 
regulation and supervision have driven the world’s economies into transformation. The 
Europe again is facing many legislative reforms and its greatest economic might, The 
Great Britain, voted 2016 in favor of resignation from the European Union. The factors 
like these, market overvaluation and shocks in the legislative environment, drive merger 
and acquisition activity across the world (Harford, 2005). The year 2015 was already the 
record year for the global merger and acquisition activity and it seems like more records 
are going to been broken in the future. Therefore, the understanding how to evaluate 
synergies and benefits from takeovers and mergers thus succeeding in them, is 
emphasized in the current economic situation. The improved tools for assessing the 
possible co-operation synergies are crucially beneficial for every future decision maker, 
pondering whether to commit on the takeover contest or not.  
 
In this paper I address the assessing problem of the acquisition synergies with the toehold 
purchase. Toeholds are the non-controlling equity purchases (less than 50% stake of the 
target company), which are made before the final takeover bid. This gives a potential 
buyer an exclusive opportunity to interact with the target and its management. The 
toeholder may nominate the director to the target company’s board or even participate in 
the development of the new products and services. It is also possible to combine 
acquirer’s and target’s operations together. (Povel & Sertsios, 2014.) Thus, the toeholder 
gets a better knowledge from target’s business model and operations, which improve the 
capability to assess the synergies together. 
 
The previous literature has approached the toehold purchases from many different 
perspectives. One approach has been the optimum theories, which have studied the 
optimal size of toehold purchase and the competitive advantage it yields in a takeover 
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contest (see e.g. Singh, 1998; Goldman & Qian, 2005; Betton, Eckbo, & Thorburn, 2009). 
The optimal size of pre-bid stake has roused many animosity views in the literature and 
no premier theory has been settled. The researches however often agree with the view of 
the toehold’s competitive advantage. The toehold works as an activator, which makes the 
toeholder bid more aggressively and thus increases the probability to win the contest 
(Goldman & Qian, 2005).  
 
The other parallel approach has studied the possible gains received from the acquisitions 
and how the potential bidder profits the most from a pre-bid stake (see e.g. Betton et al. 
2009; Bris, 2002).  The toehold profit research is somewhat overlapping with the 
implications of the optimal toehold theory, because often researchers empirically 
optimize the size of the toehold for the maximum profits. The general view is that the 
toehold is a profitable option. The final takeover bid increases the value of the target 
company and if the toeholder fails the takeover attempt, they can sell their stake with 
profit. There are also studies that see the takeover price arbitrage as an investment 
opportunity and persuades the companies to make a factitious bid to benefit from the price 
increase. (Bagnoli & Lipman, 1996). As I pointed out, the toeholds have been studied 
broadly in the former literature, even though the number of single researches are not 
notable significant. 
 
Despite the broad focus of the toeholds in the literature, the research literature focusing 
on the informational reasons behind the toehold purchase is somewhat scarce. It feels that 
the toehold literature has been more interested in a practical back end information, that 
could be implemented as a guideline for the toeholds bidders in a competitive landscape 
(questions about the optimal size or the maximum profit). However, it is equally 
important to understand the front end information about the factors and benefits that lead 
the potential acquirers to purchase toeholds before the final bid. Most of the previous 
research is also conducted on the United States market, leaving the information on the 
international M&As out, including Europe. The Europe is however a globally significant 
market area, that has a totally different legislation and business culture. The European 
toehold literature needs its own researches, since the conclusions made on the US does 
not necessarily apply in Europe. Therefore, it is of interest to study the benefits that the 
acquirers try to gather with the toehold purchase with European acquisition activity.  
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This paper provides an all-encompassing test of the toehold purchases as a tool to improve 
acquirer’s capability to evaluate the possible synergies with the target. The paper extends 
the study by Povel and Sertsios made in 2014 and tests whether the results derived from 
their toehold study hold on the European market or not. I start with the univariate analysis 
and extend it to the multivariate logistic regression model. I test the fitness of the logistic 
model with the analysis of the deviance table and with plotted ROC curve. 
 
The rest of the paper has the following structure. Section 2 presents the hypothesis of the 
study, propositions behind it and the basic assumption for which the model relies. Section 
3 explains the properties of the data and the used methods. Section 4 again presents the 
results of the regressions and implications behind them. Finally, the section 5 concludes 
and propose the focusing points for the future.  
2. Hypothesis 
 
2.1 Basic assumptions behind the hypothesis 
 
I now present briefly the basic assumptions behind my toehold model. 
 
Assumption 1. The toehold is acquired for the purpose of the final takeover. 
 
The main reason for the toehold acquisition should be the synergy advantage for the 
successful merger. If the acquirers would, for example, purchase a toehold for the profit 
of the price increase after the takeover attempt, the data would not describe the use of 
toeholds for the information benefits. The acquirer would not either be interested to co-
operate with the target company. The main motive for every pre-bid stake is not of course 
the advantage for the takeover, but my sample which consist of only the M&As which 
has resulted in major ownership stake, the assumption of the purpose holds.  
 
Assumption 2. The toehold is purchased because it allows the gathering of the synergy 
information. 
 
The reason behind the toehold is that it allows the acquirer to gather information it would 
not have access without. This might not be actualized after the initial purchase, but the 
original motive behind the purchase has to be the access to information. The possible 
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synergies may stem from cost-cutting of the overlapped operations, cross-selling, access 
to new distribution channels or the complementary R&D efforts (Povel & Sertsios, 2014). 
 
Assumption 3. The acquirer has to co-operate some time with the target company to be 
able to evaluate the synergies. 
 
This assumption is based on the intuition, that the synergy evaluation is the complex 
process that requires time and resources. The assumption relies on the truthiness of second 
assumption. If the toehold is purchased keeping eye on the evaluation purpose, the 
acquirer certainly takes time to co-operate with the target. Also the former studies shows 
that the time between toeholds and final bids is notable (see e.g. Betton et al, 2009; Povel 
& Sertsios, 2014).  
 
2.2 The main hypothesis 
 
In this paragraph I present the hypothesis being tested and the propositions that 
clarify the measures.  
 
Hypothesis. The acquirer has the pre-bid toehold purchased more likely, when the target 
is young, operates in a different nation or in a different industry. 
 
Proposition 1. The toehold is more beneficial, when the target is more difficult to 
evaluate. 
 
The younger the target company is, the more difficult is it for the outsider to evaluate it 
and its operations. The young companies have usually less data available for the acquirers 
to analyze and are often smaller sized, which might reduce the requirements for the 
financial reporting. The less there are accumulated data from the target, the more difficult 
it is to evaluate the target only with technical analysis and the more beneficial the toehold 
becomes.  
 
Proposition 2. The toehold is more beneficial when you have more unreliable 
information from the target compared than your rivals.  
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The potential acquirer who operates in a different nation or industry than the target, 
usually has unreliable information about target’s business and operation. The cross border 
acquirer often confronts unfamiliar legislation, norms, market area etc. The acquirer from 
different industry again has to sacrifice time to combine the unfamiliar business with their 
own business. The more the two countries are culturally divided (by the means of trust, 
hierarchy and individualism), the less there are attraction to cross-border acquisition 
(Ahern, Daminelli & Fracassi, 2015) and the more difficult it is to evaluate the possible 
gains from acquisition. The not familiarized acquirer benefits more from the toehold 
purchase than the rival whose information is already reliable.  
3. Data and Methods 
 
3.1 Data 
 
My data is obtained from SDC Platinum database, the leading online source for bond and 
equity new issues and merger & acquisition information, which has been tracking M&A 
activity since the 1970s1. I complement the acquired data with the information obtained 
from Thomson Reuters database. I collect the information on European acquisitions from 
the years between 2000 and 2016. I choose this certain period, because I want the results 
that explains the current factors and phenomena. The objective of the paper is 
nevertheless to create new and useful information. The research made from the toeholds 
are also at least half decade old, which means it is the interest to study the effects in a 
current economic situation. 
 
The European nations included on the data consist only of the original EU 15 nations2 
and three other economically significant nations: Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Thus 
the total number of countries included adds up to the total of 18. The Eastern European 
countries are excluded from the data. The reason for this is that the countries located in 
eastern Europe differ economically (and in the means of trust) from the other European 
countries and it would not be meaningful to generalize the findings to concern whole 
Europe. The acquisitions also need to be executed between two of the chosen 18 countries 
                                                     
1 The information is acquired from the SDC website: http://thomsonreuters.com 
2 EU 15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
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to be included, meaning that I only examine the cross acquisitions between these 
countries.  
 
The rest of the criteria relates in the type or the stake of the ownership. The target 
company has to be strictly either public or private firm. Other types of the companies are 
excluded from the data (for example the subsidiaries and the government owned 
companies). I only choose the companies that purchase a majority ownership in a final 
bid. The companies cannot own a major ownership before the acquisition. This reduces 
my data to include only the acquisitions where the acquirer holds less than 50 percent of 
the target at the time of the acquisition and where the stake after the acquisition exceeds 
50 percent.  
 
Finally, I set the last three other criteria, which reduces my sample size significantly. For 
the logistic regression presented later on the paper, the value of the deal, the founding 
year and the total assets of the target has to be available for each observation. However, 
the limited accessibility for the information of the private companies forced me to reduce 
the great portion of the private targets. The data without the final three criteria would have 
included over 14 000 single observations. The final data includes 2224 single acquisition 
observations that satisfy the described criteria above. 
 
3.2 Methods 
 
I test my hypothesis with four different empirical analytical methods. First, I use the 
univariate analysis to examine the differences between the acquisitions with the pre-bid 
stake and ones without. The univariate analysis studies only one variable at time so it 
dismisses the effects the other explanatory variables have on the intercept. I interpret the 
differences using an unpaired two-sample t-test, assuming the standard deviation varies 
between groups. The obtained p-value is the probability of two-way test.  
 
Secondly, I test empirically the probability that the acquirer had the toehold before the 
final acquisition. My dependent variable Toehold is a dummy that gets a value of 1 or 0. 
This kind of binary dependent is not normally distributed which means the linear 
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regression do not fit right. Therefore, I use the logistic regression to execute my 
regression3. My variation of the logistical regression tracks the following model:  
 
                                        𝑇𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾
′𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                         (1) 
           
where i is the subscript of the single acquisition, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of explanatory variables 
and 𝑍𝑖 is a vector of control variables.  
 
Thirdly, I interpret the results of logistic regression model by analyzing the table of 
deviance with ANOVA. The deviance measures how well the chosen logistic model fits 
to my collected data and how reliably I can trust my findings. In other words, it measures 
the quality of the fit. I also test how well my model could predict a new set of data by 
plotting a ROC4 (receiver operating characteristic) curve and measuring the AUC5 (area 
under curve), which are some measures for binary classifier (Fawcett, 2006). They tell if 
the collected sample and used regression really predict the activity in the real life. The 
ROC curve is plotted with a method where I train the 2/3 of the observations in my 
acquisition data to test the fitting for the rest 1/3 of the data. It has to be clarified, that this 
separation has a minor effect on the results of the AUC. I describe the results of the fitting 
tests with three separate measures: Accuracy term, McFadden R-squared term and AUC 
term. The logistic regression, ANOVA and ROC curve is ran using a R programming 
language and software6. 
 
I test the fitting for two different reasons. First, it would be naïve to assume that the results 
of the regression describe the true reality without testing, especially when my sample size 
is small (N = 22247) and some variables give no significant results (see Tables 2 & 3). 
Second, Deviances and ROC curve makes it possible to utilize and develop this study 
further in the future researches. Like mentioned in the previous passage, the ROC curve 
                                                     
3 Other option would be a probit regression, which results a similar outcome. 
4 Receiver operating characteristic is a technique for visualizing, organizing and 
selecting classifiers based on their performance (Fawcett, 2006). 
5 Area Under Curve is a single scalar value excepting the performance of the model. It 
takes values between 1 to 0, where 1 is an excellent and 0 poor performance.  
6 ANOVA and ROC tutorial provided by Alice, M. 2015. Datascience+. 
http://datascienceplus.com/perform-logistic-regression-in-r/ 
7 Despite the small sample size, it is significant and should give trustworthy results.  
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makes it possible to test how probably the phenomenon would occur in a real life, and 
therefore, it is a great tool for a future analysis. 
 
3.3 Explanatory variables 
 
I use total of 5 different variables called Private, Age, Cross Border and Different 
Industry and Total Assets. The three variables, Age, Cross Border and Different Industry, 
are explanatory, that correlate with the possibility that the acquirer holds a toehold prior 
the acquisition for the information advantages. In other words, the explanatory variables 
capture the opaqueness of the target. The other two variables, Private and Total Assets, 
are control variables. The dependent variable is called Toehold. 
 
The dependent variable Toehold is a dummy, that gets the value of 1 when the acquirer 
holds a toehold at the public announcement of the merger and 0 otherwise. I approach the 
definition of a toehold in a broad perspective. The classical approach usually determinates 
the size of the toehold purchase to be below 5% because of the legally binding obligation 
to announce publicly the ownerships that exceeds this threshold8 (Goldman & Qian, 
2005). However, I examine all of the toeholds which has even a smallest ownership before 
the announcement, but with less than a major ownership rights of 50%. I believe the 
information advantages is transmitted to results equally well with the larger toehold 
purchases as with the smaller purchases. It is reasonable to assume that the greater stake 
makes it easier the co-operate with the target, since the greater stake leads to greater 
control power.    
 
My three explanatory variables are constructed as dummies. The first variable Age 
represents the youngness of the target company. The measure for the dummy is calculated 
by subtracting the effective year of the merger from the founding year. Then, the variable 
is constructed as a dummy. It takes the value of 1 if the company is equal or less than 3 
years old at the time of the final acquisition (the major ownership acquisition) and 0 if 
older. I chose the 3-year threshold intuitively. The classical theory of forecasting defines 
the short term as the years from 0 to 3. Usually this is the time perspective from where 
                                                     
8 The USA: Schedule 13D authorised by SEC (5%). Europe: The Transparency Directive 
authorised by ESMA and national regulations on notification obligations. Finland: The 
Securities Markets Act authorised by FIN-FSA (5%, 10% etc.).  
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the specific and meaningful results can be received. The strict boundaries might make it 
however more difficult to get the significant results, since the possibility to vary reduces. 
However, the dummy also dismissed the effect of the outer observations (really old 
companies), which could distort my data. This makes sense, as the younger target means 
that the acquirer is not able to gather sufficient information from it and the age does not 
however limitlessly increase the usefulness of the information. (Povel & Sertsios, 2014.) 
The age variable captures the difficultness to evaluate the target from the outsider’s 
perspective.  
 
The second explanatory variable Cross Border dummy, takes a value of 1 if the target and 
the acquirer operate in different nations and 0 otherwise. The cross-border variable 
captures the acquirers amount of the unreliable information (Povel & Sertsios, 2014). The 
frequency of the M&A activity in each nation and usually size of the economy leads to 
slight bias in the distribution of nations. The smaller nations of the chosen 18 nations are 
unfortunately underrepresented in the data. The Great Britain has the largest 
representation in my data, while the Iceland and Finland are the examples of the 
underrepresentation. Even though the nations are not distributed evenly, it would not be 
meaningful to weight the results based on some criteria. The European market are so 
divergent that the results cannot be possibly applied to every nation. Now the results 
describe the toehold activity of the most economically meaningful European countries.  
 
The third explanatory variable Different Industry dummy, takes a value of 1 if the 
acquirer and the target operate in a different industries and 0 otherwise. I use a so-called 
strict approach when defining the industries that is I give the value of 0 only when the 
companies operates precisely in the same main industry. Therefore, the industries that 
have common elements (for example two manufacturer companies) or supportive 
functions are seen as different industries and some of the synergies and the business 
knowledge are ignored. The intuition behind the variable is that the acquirer is able to 
better analyse the target company when they have an initial knowledge from the business.  
 
I use the variable Private to control the logistic regression. Private is a dummy, that takes 
a value of 1 when the target is a privately held and 0 when it is a listed and traded public 
company. The partition between private and public company is a mutually exclusive and 
targets have to be reckoned as one or the other. Thus, acquisitions where the target 
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belongs to some other company form (for example joint ventures or subsidiaries) are 
excluded. The number of subsidiaries were substantial in the original data. However, he 
subsidiaries are excluded, because their original business purpose is too difficult to 
evaluate. The subsidiaries have many possible functions, which some could distort the 
results. In a literature, the subsidiaries have often been classified in to a 4 different types, 
by examining the activities the subsidiary undertake in its strategy concerning the market 
scope and the value-adding scope. This means for example that some of the subsidiaries 
are created in keeping eye of the local host market and some for pursuing international 
expansion. (Hogenbirk & Kranenburg, 2006.) There are also special subsidiaries, which 
original function is to provide finance for the parent company (for example captive 
finance companies) or to be sold right after the foundation. The spectrum and the 
properties of the subsidiaries are so board that including them in to the data could distort 
the information and therefore the results.  
 
The last variable Total Assets, is the book value of the target company in current host 
currency in the year of the merger and works as a control variable for the regression. The 
companies with the larger assets are usually more capable of acquiring the pre-bid 
toeholds and thus winning the bidding competition (Povel & Sertsios, 2014). This is 
important notice because the size of the companies, which the total assets variable 
describes indirectly, varies a lot in my sample. The variation in the sizes can be seen in 
the standard deviation column in Table 1. 
 
3.4 Summary Statistics 
 
My acquisition data includes 2224 different acquisition observations on European market 
between 2000 and 2016. The descriptive statistic of the sample is shown in the Table 1 
below. 
 
In the sample, slightly less than 16% of the acquirers purchased a toehold before the major 
acquisition, which sums up to a total of 354 toeholders. This is notably more than the 
previous researches has indicated. Bates, Lemmon and Linck (2006) conducted the study 
where the number of the acquirers holding a toehold was less than 5%. The recent study 
again displayed a number of 2% (Povel & Sertsios, 2014) There are to possible reason 
for the difference. The former studies have been focusing only on the USA’s M&A 
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activity as mentioned in the beginning of this paper. European market area is however 
more divergent compared to the United States, with multiple nations, legislations and 
languages. Under the main hypothesis (Proposition 2.) the difference could imply that the 
more divergent European market makes the cross border information more unreliable. 
The toeholds would be the answer for the target evaluation. Later, when I present the 
results of the multivariate regression, we see, however, that the effect of the Cross Border 
variable is not significant. 
 
The other plausible reason for the relatively large number of toeholds might stem from 
the statistical content of the data. In my data only 41% of the targets are privately held 
companies, which is notable less than in the previous researches. Toeholds are usually 
more common in publicly traded companies due the poor liquidity of the private shares. 
Therefore, it makes a sense that a larger number of public companies results in a larger 
number of toehold purchases9. (Povel & Sertsios, 2014.) 
 
The other surprising takeaway from the summary statistic is the toehold size. The mean 
size of the toehold is almost 30%, which is relatively high compared to a classical view 
on the toeholds, where the optimum would be 5% (see e.g. Sertsios & Povel, 2014 and 
Betton et al. 2009). This is the threshold, after which the acquirer has to publicly announce 
its intentions behind the purchases. There are also researches that even exceeds the 
classical view and claim that the optimal would be even less than 5% due the costs of 
managerial entrenchment if the takeover attempt fails. (Goldman & Qian, 2005.) Hence, 
the conflict between the optimal toehold theories and my findings is significant. 
 
However, there are also opposite views on the benefits of the toeholds. It is often pointed 
out, that the initial shareholders gain from the public takeover attempt. The announcement 
of the takeover builds up the price of the target firms’ shares and initial shareholder 
profits. (Bagnoli & Lipman, 1996.) The theories presented above imply that the bigger 
mean of the toehold size in the European market might stem from the lower joint costs of 
                                                     
9 Povel & Sertsios offer also a contradictory theory for probability of toehold purchases 
called ”opaque effect”. Private companies are more opaque implying that the larger 
number of public companies should decrease the number of toeholds acquired.  
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failed takeover attempt, lower consequence costs of exceeded threshold purchase or larger 
possibilities to profit from the rapid price increase. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics. 
This table shows the descriptive statistic of the data collected from 2224 different acquisitions in Europe 
between 2000 and 2016. The dependent variable Toehold takes a value of 1 if the acquirer has a pre-bid 
ownership, and 0 otherwise. The control variable Private takes a value of 1 if target is a private firm and 0 
if it is a publicly held. The explanatory variable Age takes a value of 1 if the target is younger or equal than 
3 years old at a time of the acquisition, otherwise 0. The Cross Border explanatory variable takes a value 
of 1 if the acquirer and the target operate in different nations, otherwise 0. The Different Industry variable 
takes a value of 1 if the acquirer and the target come from different industries. The Total Asset variable is 
the sum of the target’s total assets in the year of the acquisition. Final ownership stake presents the 
acquirer’s ownership percent after the acquisition for all 2224 different acquisitions. Final ownership stake 
preceded by a toehold presents again the same ownership percent, but only for the acquisitions that had 
pre-bid toehold purchased.  
 
 
The companies also evidently seek an overall ownership of the target company. The 
average mean of the final ownership stake preceded by a toehold is almost 84% and even 
larger when examining all targets. Close to 70% of all the acquirers purchase the full 
ownership.  I find this interesting, because only the 50% is enough to justify a full control 
right. The Figure 1 below shows the distributions of the pre-bid toehold size and stake of 
the ownership after the acquisition. 
 
Variable Mean Median Pctile 10 Pctile 90 SD N
Toehold 0,16 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,37 2224
Private 0,41 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,49 2224
Age 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,30 2224
Cross Border 0,20 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,40 2224
Different Industry 0,59 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,49 2224
Total Assets 6713,65 58,05 2,70 1 903,4 114109,10 2224
Toehold Size 29,51 30,00 10,10 46,00 12,72 354
Final Ownership Stake 92,19 100,00 63,70 100,00 14,79 2224
Final Ownership Stake Preceded by a 
Toehold
83,55 92,65 54,40 100,00 18,10 354
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More than half of the acquisitions were fulfilled between different industries but only 
fifth across the different nations. It seems that the classical theory factors of equity home 
bias appear also on M&A activity. One reason is that the domestic equities and 
acquisitions provide great hedge against the home country specific risks, such as domestic 
inflation (Lewis, 1996). It seems that the different industry is not a concern in the 
European acquisitions. The initial conclusion stems from the industry separation I chose 
for the variable as mentioned before. The strict defining of the main industry does not 
take into account the information the acquirer usually has from the joint industries. For 
example, many company has reliable information from to both sides of the value chain, 
even though they might be separated totally into different industry categories. Therefore, 
the most of the acquirers initiate the cross industry mergers anyway. The other reason 
would be the large conglomerate companies that uses the acquisitions as growth strategy. 
Conglomerates are specialised to cross industry (and cross border) mergers and hence are 
better at evaluating the synergies of the targets. After all the whole business model stems 
from the released synergies. (Mueller, 1969.)   
 
Figure 1 & 2. Toehold Size and Acquired Ownership Distribution.  
Panel A figures the size of the toeholds held at the time of the announcement from 0 to 50% in a frequency 
of 5%. Its sample size is 354 toehold observations. Panel B figures the final ownership distribution for 
every observation. Its sample size then is the 2224 observations. In both panels, Y-axis shows the density 
(the portion of the observations) of different classes and X-axis the frequently separated classes.   
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4. Results 
 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
 
The results of the univariate analysis are seen on the Table 2, where I compare the means 
for acquisitions with and without toehold. The results show that the acquirers purchase a 
toehold more likely when they operate on the different industry than the target company. 
Therefore, the toehold is purchased when the target industry's business and operations are 
unfamiliar or unknown and thus information is unreliable. This confirms the main 
hypothesis (under proposition 1). The effect is significant at 1% level. Also, the control 
variable Private, is highly significant (p-value of 2,29e-73).  
 
However, the different operating nations or the age of the company does not have a 
significant effect on the probability to purchase toehold - like I predicted in the 
hypothesis. The initial conclusion would be the poor capability of the univariate model to 
represent the reality. However, the multivariate analysis in the next chapter shows parallel 
results. I present the speculations of the results later in this section. Despite of the 
negligible effect, the completely opposite effect of these explanatory variables can be 
nevertheless dismissed, based on the theory and former studies (Povel & Sertsios, 2014). 
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Table 2. Univariate analysis. 
This table shows the variables Private, Age, Cross Border, Different Industry and Total Assets to sorted in 
two groups, acquisitions with and without a toehold. First two columns show the mean of each variable. 
Third column shows the difference in the means of variables. The fourth column shows the probability 
value of the T test. The last column presents the significance level at: *5%, **1% and ***0,1%. 
 
 
4. 2 Regression Analysis 
 
In the following passage, I examine the test of my hypothesis in a multivariate setting 
using a logistic regression. The regression is run using all of the variables with 2224 
separated acquisitions. I present the results in the Table 3.  
 
The results of the logistic regression are similar with the results of the univariate analysis 
presented before. The effect of the Different Industry explanatory variable is significant 
at the 5% significance level, while the effect of the other explanatory variables cannot be 
shown to be significant. Despite the fact that the Cross Border effect on toehold purchase 
has decreased from 1% to 5% significance level, the significance is enough to prove the 
use of toehold purchases as the mean for the target evaluation. Thus, the multivariate 
logistic regression confirms the results of the univariate analysis (Table 2). A target 
company operating in a different industry is more difficult to evaluate (in means of 
unreliable information) and the acquirer benefits hugely from the synergy information the 
pre-bid purchase allows.  
 
The other takeaway is the increased effect of the Cross Border variable when compared 
to univariate regression. The increase is notable, almost 30%, but still not entitle variable 
for level of significance. This might nevertheless tell that the cross border variable has a 
greater effect on the benefit of toehold purchase than the univariate analysis presumes. 
Unfortunately, the multivariate regression decreases the probabilities of every other 
variable when compared to univariate analysis. In some variables the difference is huge. 
Variable Toehold 1 (N=354) Toehold 0 (N=1870)
Difference (Toehold 1 - 
Toehold 0)
T Test (p value)
Private 0,09 0,47 -0,38 0,00 ***
Age 0,11 0,10 0,01 0,53
Cross border 0,19 0,20 -0,01 0,58
Different Industry 0,65 0,58 0,07 0,01 **
Total Assets 19170,45 4355,52 14814,93 0,16
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For example, the decrease in Age variable is over 20%, which can be seen having no 
effect at all when examined with logistical analysis. The effect might so also be quite 
contrary opposite.  
 
Table 3. Logistic regression analysis. 
This table shows the results of the logistic regression made with R coding language. The first column shows 
the regression estimate for each variable. Second column shows the variable’s standard error. Third column 
shows the standard score (Z-value) for each variable. The fourth column shows the probability value of the 
logistic regression. Last column presents the significance level at: *5%, **1% and ***0,1%. The N tells 
the sample size of the data. McFadden R-squared is a substitute coefficient of the determination for logistic 
regression. Accuracy is a measure of statistical bias of the logistic regression. Area Under Curve is an 
accuracy measure for the capability of my logistic regression to predict the effects with new set of data. 
Calculated from the area under a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. 
 
 
4.3 Speculation of the results 
 
The effect of the variable Different Industry is significant measured with both the 
univariate and the multivariate model. However, the explanatory variables Age and Cross 
Border do not show the significant effect. The first ambiguous reason would be that the 
Europe could be actually more unified than thought. Even though it is the mix of many 
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error Z value Pr(>|Z|)
Private -2,212 0,194 -11,403 <2e-16 ***
Age 0,067 0,197 0,340 0,734
Cross Border -0,165 0,154 -1,053 0,293
Different Industry 0,253 0,126 2,005 0,045 *
Total Assets 0,000 0,000 1,204 0,229 .
Toehold (Intercept) -1,262 0,111 -11,359 <2e-16 ***
N 2224
McFadden R-squared 0,112
Accuracy 0,845
Area Under the Curve 0,735
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different nations, I feel the economies in the Middle-Europe is quite homogenous. The 
problem are the border nations that are more diversified. However, the data is slightly 
biased towards the greater European economies (The Great Britain, Germany etc.), that 
are similar together. The explanation might hence be the slightly biased data. 
 
The other explanation could be the small sample size of the observations. I had to reduce 
my data a notably, because the information about the private companies are scarce. 
Therefore, my observations might have slightly picked the certain properties with 
random. The advocacy however is that the information obtained are checked through 
manually and seem to be reliable.  
 
Third point is that the results will not prove the opposite effect either. For example, in the 
Table 2, the difference of the univariate effect gives a parallel result, even though they 
are not significant. We cannot say if these effects describe the true reality but we cannot 
either abrogate them. Therefore, the propositions hold in the light of the former literature.  
 
4. 4 The fitting of the model 
 
In this section, I briefly present the results of the model’s quality-to-fit. The results for 
the table of deviance derived from ANOVA is presented in a Table 4. The ROC curve 
again is plotted in Figure 3.  
 
The results show that the logistic model fits mediocrely well, when examining the 
difference between null deviance and residual deviance. The value of deviance decreases 
from 1949,5 to 1730,7, ergo 218,8 points on 5 degrees of freedom. The quality of fit could 
be better, but the result is in my opinion manageable. However, single explanatory 
variables should have bigger deviances. The private variable captures the major part of 
the fitness, but fortunately also Cross Industry, Cross border and Total Assets variables 
show the mediocre fit. From these variables private is significant at the 0,1% level and 
the Cross Industry at the 5% level.  Age variable however do not fit to the logistic model 
at all and should be dismissed. 
 
The other option for evaluating the fitting is the McFadden’s R-squared. Its 
interpretations are however ambiguous, like with every pseudo R-squared measure. 
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McFadden itself states that the value of 0,11 would mean the good fit for the model 
(McFadden, 1973). 
 
The ROC curve shows the good predictive ability of the model. The line is distinctively 
above the fictional linear line, which means the model can somewhat predict the result 
for the new set of observations. The calculated area under the curve is 0,74, which 
confirms the results of the plot. However, I want to remind that the results of the ROC 
and AUC are depending on the separation of the observation data into a train and test 
part, as mentioned before in the methods section. The portion of these parts affect in the 
quality of the ROC curve. This challenge is addressed with the manual testing over the 
different possibilities. Even though there were slight differences in the result, the variation 
was slight and do not effect on the interpretation of the fitting. I chose the Roc curve in 
the middle of the possible options to avoid falsifying the presented results. 
 
Table 4. Analysis of Deviance Table. 
This table shows the deviances of the different variables. The first column shows the degrees of freedom 
for ANOVA. The second column shows the null deviance, which measures how well the explanatory 
variable is predicted by the model with only the intercept (Toehold) variable. The third column presents 
the residual degrees of freedom. The fourth column presents the residual deviance, which shows the quality 
of fit with predictors included. The fifth column is the probability value for the deviance for each variable. 
Last column presents the significance level of the variable at: *5%, **1% and ***0,1%. 
 
 
 
Df Deviance Resid. Df Resid. Dev Pr(>Chi)
NULL 2223 1949,5
Private 1 211,496 2222 1738,0 < 2e-16 ***
Age 1 0,059 2221 1738,0 0,8074
Cross Border 1 1,556 2220 1736,4 0,2122
Cross Industry 1 4,157 2219 1732,3 0,0415 *
Total Assets 1 1,574 2218 1730,7 0,2097
Accuracy 0,845
Area Under the Curve 0,735
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Figure 3. Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (ROC) 
This figure presents the ROC curve, which captures the predication ability of the model. The closer the line 
is on the left-top corner, the better is the ability. If the line is linear in the middle (line from (0,0) to (1,1)) 
or close to right-bottom corner the prediction ability is poor and the results derived with the model are 
random. The area under the curve (AUC) describes the same features quantitatively. The AUC takes a value 
between 1 to 0, where 1 is a perfect prediction ability and 0 no ability at all.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have analyzed the use of the toeholds as the improving tool of the 
acquirer’s capabilities to better evaluate the possible synergies with the target. The 
acquirer relies on the toehold, when it is difficult to evaluate the target with the 
information available on the markets or when the information is unreliable. Toeholds 
allows the co-operation with the target, which eventually lead more successful takeovers.  
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I show that the European acquirers rely on the toeholds when the acquisitions are made 
across the borders of different industries. However, the age of the target or the cross 
border acquisition do not show the significant results, like predicted in the hypothesis. 
This might stem from the properties of the unified European market area or from the 
reduced sample size. I also prove my findings by showing the adequate fitting for the 
logistical model.  
 
The contribution of the paper is to provide the ground for the toehold research on the 
European markets. The paper expands the important perspective of the toeholds as the 
assessment tool for bidders, which is scarce in the academic literature, and encourages 
the researchers to continue developing more knowledge from the phenomenon. The role 
of the toeholds will become more significant in the following years due the increased 
M&A activity driven by the global overvaluation. Therefore, the paper pursues also to 
generate practical knowledge of the competitive advantages the toehold allows. This 
knowledge is highly beneficial for every possible acquirer evaluating the possible 
takeovers.  
 
This paper focuses narrowly on the two different propositions of the synergy benefits, 
which is measured only with three different explanatory variables. The simple approach 
is chosen for the more applicable and understandable approach, but it leaves room for the 
future research. Like I mentioned in the previous chapter, the contribution has been basing 
a ground for the future research and more encompassing research is required to describe 
the complex reality.  
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